<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Principal-Agent Problem on C.CUI's Log</title><link>https://cuicaihao.github.io/tags/principal-agent-problem/</link><description>Recent content in Principal-Agent Problem on C.CUI's Log</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-AU</language><lastBuildDate>Thu, 09 Jul 2026 07:00:00 +1000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://cuicaihao.github.io/tags/principal-agent-problem/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>The Principal-Agent Problem: Why Without Understanding This, Organizations Always Seem Like Palace Dramas</title><link>https://cuicaihao.github.io/posts/2026-07-09-the-principal-agent-problem-why-without-understanding-this-organizations-always-seem-like-palace-dramas/</link><pubDate>Thu, 09 Jul 2026 07:00:00 +1000</pubDate><guid>https://cuicaihao.github.io/posts/2026-07-09-the-principal-agent-problem-why-without-understanding-this-organizations-always-seem-like-palace-dramas/</guid><description>This post introduces the principal-agent problem, an economic concept explaining why organizations often face challenges due to misaligned interests and information asymmetry between those who want work done (principals) and those who do it (agents). It explores the structural roots of these issues, from personal &amp;ldquo;scams&amp;rdquo; to &amp;ldquo;management failures,&amp;rdquo; arguing that effective solutions require principals to retain core rights over goal definition, information verification, and final judgment, moving beyond reliance on personal loyalty.</description></item></channel></rss>