<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Political Economy on C.CUI's Log</title><link>https://cuicaihao.github.io/tags/political-economy/</link><description>Recent content in Political Economy on C.CUI's Log</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-AU</language><lastBuildDate>Thu, 11 Jun 2026 07:00:00 +1000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://cuicaihao.github.io/tags/political-economy/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>The Evolution of Government: From Protection Fees to Social Contract</title><link>https://cuicaihao.github.io/posts/2026-06-11-the-evolution-of-government-from-protection-fees-to-social-contract/</link><pubDate>Thu, 11 Jun 2026 07:00:00 +1000</pubDate><guid>https://cuicaihao.github.io/posts/2026-06-11-the-evolution-of-government-from-protection-fees-to-social-contract/</guid><description>This article explores the unconventional origins of government, positing that states evolved from &amp;lsquo;roving bandits&amp;rsquo; to &amp;lsquo;stationary bandits&amp;rsquo; who offered protection in exchange for &amp;rsquo;taxes&amp;rsquo;. Drawing on insights from Mancur Olson, Thomas Hobbes, Max Weber, and others, it illustrates how the need for order, fueled by warfare and the strategic advantage of taxing staple crops like grain, led to the formation of powerful states and ultimately, the social contract.</description></item></channel></rss>