<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Moral Hazard on C.CUI's Log</title><link>https://cuicaihao.github.io/tags/moral-hazard/</link><description>Recent content in Moral Hazard on C.CUI's Log</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-AU</language><lastBuildDate>Fri, 12 Jun 2026 07:00:00 +1000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://cuicaihao.github.io/tags/moral-hazard/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Soft Budget Constraint: When a Safety Net Exists, Accountability Distorts</title><link>https://cuicaihao.github.io/posts/2026-06-12-soft-budget-constraint-when-a-safety-net-exists-accountability-distorts/</link><pubDate>Fri, 12 Jun 2026 07:00:00 +1000</pubDate><guid>https://cuicaihao.github.io/posts/2026-06-12-soft-budget-constraint-when-a-safety-net-exists-accountability-distorts/</guid><description>This post delves into the concept of &amp;ldquo;soft budget constraint,&amp;rdquo; where the expectation of a bailout distorts accountability and encourages risky behavior. It uses examples ranging from personal debt and corporate overspending to state-owned enterprises and the &amp;ldquo;too big to fail&amp;rdquo; financial institutions. The article explains how a perceived safety net undermines budget discipline, leading to a dynamic commitment problem where initial promises to withhold aid are often broken.</description></item></channel></rss>